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Problem Description
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is an emerging low-power wireless technology developed
for short-range control and monitoring applications. It links wireless sensors via
radio channels to cell phones and computers, leveraging a ready-built infrastructure
for data transmission.
Advertisement is a method to utilize a Bluetooth device to deliver messages to
other Bluetooth devices in the way of non-connection. There are two typical roles
involved in BLE connectionless advertisement: advertiser and scanner. Advertiser
periodically broadcast advertising packets over BLE radio channels and may respond
with more service data upon request from peering devices. Scanner listen to adver-
tising messages from advertiser and may choose to either request further information
from the advertiser or ignore the messages. However, connectionless advertisement
over open radio channels has the risks of privacy leakage and device tracking.
The concern of this project is that the BLE devices are expected to utilize privacy
enhancement for confidential advertisement and anti-tracking of devices. All the work
will build upon Bluetooth core specification version 4.1, investigating the existing
BLE connection-oriented privacy mechanisms and properties where essential, and
analyzing their strengths and weaknesses. In addition to that, privacy enhancement
for connectionless advertisement will then be proposed. The enhancement will focus
on both cryptographic analysis and practical implementation.
Assignment Given: February, 2014
Professor: Stig Frode Mjølsnes
Supervisor: Sandeep Choudhary

Abstract
The aim of this project is to design, simulate, and implement a privacy
enhancement protocol over BLE advertising channels. The design of the
privacy enhancement is generic and modular. Due to the risk of privacy
disclosure and device tracking by adversary, the main focus will be put
on designing and implementing message confidentiality, replay prevention,
and anti-tracking of device over BLE advertising channels. Bluetooth
core specification 4.1 is used as baseline for design and implementation.
In order to provide resistance against replay attacks and device track-
ing, this project has taken counter approach. It proposes a 3-way hand-
shake protocol for nonce Rs deployment. There are two nonces Ra and
Rs involved in the 3-way handshake protocol. The advertiser generates
a nonce Ra as challenge sent to the scanner, which assures of freshness
of the advertising session. Then the scanner generates a nonce Rs for
advertising confidentiality and replay prevention. After the nonce Rs is
deployed successfully from the scanner to the advertiser, the local counters
Receiving (RX) and Transmitting (TX) on both sides are initialized to
be Rs which protects all the following advertisement in the advertising
session.
To accommodate to open BLE advertising channels a handling mech-
anism of counter out-of-synchronization is given in system design. More-
over, to avoid unnecessary power consumption in the BLE devices then
mitigation for Denial-of-service (DoS) is also proposed.
In addition, advertising confidentiality, replay prevention, and anti-
tracking of device have been simulated in Scyther and also been integrated
into the code. The functional tests have been done in a realistic testing
environment. The results show that the added functionalities work as
designed.
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Chapter1Introduction
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is an emerging low-power wireless technology developed
for short-range control and monitoring applications. It links wireless sensors via
radio channels to cell phones and computers, leveraging a ready-built infrastructure
for data transmission.
Advertisement is a method to utilize a Bluetooth device to deliver messages to
other Bluetooth devices in connectionless mode. The recipient device can choose
to request further information from the advertiser or ignore the messages. As BLE
becomes more and more popular, BLE devices have received some attention in privacy
with regards to their advertisement.
BLE device address and service data within advertisement over open radio channels
gives adversary opportunity to disclose user privacy and track the communicating
devices. In some cases the adversary can collect data within advertisement about
device information and user habit without the users’ consent, which leak users’
privacy and may cause more consequence. All the potential risks motivate a built-in
mechanism to protect user privacy. BLE devices are, thus, supposed to provide an
enhanced privacy protection to advertisement.
1.1 Privacy on BLE
Bluetooth core specification 4.1 is aware of the potential privacy risks during connec-
tion mode and connection procedures [Gro13c]. In order to use private address over
data channels to reconnect to known BLE devices, there are different mechanisms
for device anonymity in the specification, which consists of NRPA and RPA. Among
the core specification, four of the privacy features state that [Gro13d]:
• A privacy-enabled peripheral device should use a RPA in undirected connectable
mode, and use a RPA or NRPA in scanning answer.
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• A privacy-enabled central device should use a RPA to create a connection, and
use a RPA or NRPA in active scanning request.
• A privacy-enabled broadcaster shall use either a RPA or NRPA in the broadcast
mode.
• A privacy-enabled observer can use either a RPA or NRPA in an active scanning
request.
If the privacy features are enabled, BLE devices use private addresses to send
connection request to a peer device. The peer BLE devices has to retrieve a pre-
stored bonding database in order to resolve the private addresses. The goal of the
process is to associate a private address with a legitimate communicating device.
1.2 Thesis motivation
However, the existing privacy features in section 1.1 are not used to advertise in the
Generic Access Profile (GAP) discovery mode and procedures [Gro13c]. Since in
open radio environment the advertising packets can be eavesdropped by adversary,
there will also be a concern with BLE device privacy within BLE connectionless
advertisement. This concern motivates the research of this thesis.
The first step of this thesis is to use the Bluetooth core specification 4.1 as baseline,
and put the existing privacy features in section 1.1 to connectionless advertising
context to evaluate if the existing connection-oriented privacy features can be re-used
directly to connectionless BLE advertisement.
Then the vulnerabilities of the existing privacy features are identified by analysis
of advertisement. Due to no protection of counter or timestamp, the procedure with
RPA or NRPA has suffered from problems with both replay attacking and device
tracking. An adversary can replay advertisement with RPA or NRPA, and attempt to
elicit response from a peer BLE device which is then traceable. Furthermore, service
data within advertisement will not be protected by the existing privacy features. It
means that the adversary is able to capture service data in plaintext over the open
advertising channels. If the service data is static, it can also be used to track the
sending BLE device.
With intention to solve the vulnerabilities mentioned before, this thesis will
provide a solution that enhances user privacy over BLE advertising channels. It
prevents replaying attack and device tracking within BLE advertisement.
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1.3 Thesis objective
1.3.1 Main objective
The main objective of this thesis is to enhance the privacy features in Bluetooth core
specification 4.1 by strengthening confidential advertisement and countermeasures
against replay attacking and device tracking.
Privacy concerns arise whenever private information within advertisement is
transmitted. In order to meet these concerns, this thesis will focus on private BLE
advertisement about how to establish attacking models, how to transmit the private
information in an insecure environment, and how to resist on various attacks. Other
aspect of privacy, such as after connection is established, will not be covered to the
same extent.
1.3.2 Research questions
In terms of the main objective there are two research questions I would like to
investigate:
• How can we protect private information within advertisement, including BLE
device address and static service data.
• Can we propose a system design that can prevent replay attacking and keep
adversary from tracking BLE devices.
1.4 Research method
In order to address the research questions, the following steps will be followed in this
project:
• Review existing privacy features in the Bluetooth core specification 4.1.
• List most possible scenarios for privacy leakage and tracking BLE devices.
• Make system design to enhance BLE privacy.
• Simulate the privacy enhancement protocol and verify security claims of the
protocol.
• Implement the system design and demonstrate the enhanced privacy protocol.
The internal design cycle is one of the most important of any design research project.
After defining research objectives, the research activities of this thesis will iterate
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among the system design, implementation, evaluation, and improvement based on
the feedback of the evaluation [HMPR04]. In terms of project requirements and
constraints, the whole project will follow the internal design cycle iteratively until a
satisfactory design is achieved.
In this project, in order to evaluate implementation of the system design, func-
tionality and integration test will be performed in a realistic environment. All test
scenarios will be relevant to privacy disclosure and device tracking.
1.5 Thesis contribution
Several contributions are made by this thesis to the field of BLE privacy protection
over advertising channels. There are existing privacy protection mechanisms for
connection-oriented communication in Bluetooth core specification 4.1. However, the
contributions made by this thesis focus on connectionless advertisement and haven’t
yet been defined in the standard specification:
• Identifying attacking models for BLE advertisement, both with respect to
user privacy requirements and nature of open BLE advertising channels, and
performing the classification.
• Pre-study existing and relevant BLE knowledge, identifying their core charac-
teristics and grouping them together.
• Making system requirements for BLE privacy enhancement protocol over
advertising channels.
• Proposing a complete privacy enhancement protocol over advertising channels.
• Developing analytical models for simulating and analyzing security properties
of the BLE privacy enhancement protocol over advertising channels.
• Implementing and testing a demonstration code, to make sure feasibility of the
privacy enhanced protocol in real BLE advertising environment.
1.6 Outline
In Chapter 2, it gives an overview of BLE architecture, along with a detailed descrip-
tion of advertisement and security features defined in Bluetooth core specification 4.1.
If the reader already has competence about BLE system structure, advertisement,
and security features, the reader can jump to Chapter 3 directly.
In Chapter 3, an overview of current research process of BLE privacy, and privacy
challenge in this research area is given.
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In Chapter 4, it describes system design for BLE privacy enhancement.
In Chapter 5, the privacy enhancement protocol will be simulated and verified in
Scyther security protocol verification tool.
In Chapter 6, the implementation of system design will be described. Functional
and integration test is used as criteria to evaluate privacy level and performance of
the system design.
In Chapter 7, future work will be covered. In this chapter, the focus will be put
on potential improvements within this project which can be made in the future.
In Chapter 8, a conclusion for this project is made.

Chapter2BLE background
In the first section of this chapter the BLE overview and layer structure relevant to this
project is described. In the second section the mechanism of data transportation in
BLE is presented. The third section details characteristics of the BLE advertisement.
The last section outlines underlying BLE security mechanisms.
2.1 Core system architecture
BLE is a low-power wireless technology for short-range control and monitoring
applications. It operates in the 2.4 GHz ISM band and is able to link wireless sensors
to cell phones or computers via 40 radio channels in the way of ad-hoc [Gro13a]. BLE
devices can utilize a ready-built BLE infrastructure for data transmission within an
effective range. Figure 2.1 illustrates BLE core system architecture. In following,
different perspectives of BLE relevant to this project will be introduced.
2.2 Data transport
In BLE, a layer structure will be utilized to transport data
and the structure is illustrated by figure 2.2. L2CAP layer
can mimic an integration from transport layer down to data
link layer in OSI model, which establishes a connection
between two devices. It can process variable-sized user
data from application layer, and encapsulate user data
into frame [Gro13b]. The second layer, link layer, provides
interfaces between L2CAP layer and physical layer. It is
controlled by a state machine and provides flow control of
data transmission. The Physical layer contains interfaces
for many physical interfaces and conducts data transmission
through radio system.
Link Layer
L2CAP  Layer
Physical Layer
Figure 2.2: BLE data
transport structure,
adopted from [Gro13b]
7
8 2. BLE BACKGROUND
Control services
Data traffic
GAP
HCI
BLE controller
Baseband Resource Manager
Link Manager
Link Controller
BLE Radio(PHY)
BLE host
L2CAP Resource Manager
Channel Manager
L2CAP
Applications/Profiles
SMP ATT/GATT SDP
Figure 2.1: BLE core system architecture, adopted from [Gro13a]
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2.2.1 Physical layer
The physical layer is also named driver-layer and contains many physical interfaces.
In this project, the main focus will be put on BLE physical advertising channels. The
advertising channels are a set of three fixed physical channels spread evenly across
the BLE frequency spectrum. One complete advertising session must be operated on
the same physical channel between two communicating devices within their effective
range. Due to a strong likelihood of physical channel collision caused by multiple
BLE tuning their transceivers to the same physical channels, a random access address
will be generated by BLE devices to identify a physical link [Gro13b].
2.2.2 Link layer
The link layer of a BLE device
can be operated in terms of a
state machine with the follow-
ing states: Idle, Advertising, Ini-
tiating, Scanning, and Connec-
tion. Non-connectable advertise-
ment will use the states: Idle, Ad-
vertising, Scanning. Connectable
advertisement uses Idle, Initiating,
and Connection states [Gro13h].
The state change of link layer will
take place according to various in-
put at a given timeslot. Figure
2.3 illustrates the link layer state
machine.
Advertising Initiating
(master)
Scanning
(scanner)
(advertiser)
Connection
(slave/master)
Idle
Figure 2.3: BLE link layer state machine, adopted
from [Gro13h]
2.2.3 L2CAP layer
L2CAP provides transport interface to applications and services. It can create
connection to peer devices in equivalent entities. The endpoints of L2CAP channel
can be identified by a Channel Identifier (CID). The main role of L2CAP is to create,
configure, and tear down channels. In addition, it is responsible for Service Data
Units (SDU) multiplexing and segmentation, flow control [Gro13b].
As to the detail of encapsulation, L2CAP layer encapsulates asynchronous and
isochronous user data into frame. Unicast user data between two BLE devices will
be transported by connection-oriented L2CAP channels. Broadcasting data will be
transported by connectionless L2CAP channels. However, if it is not required to
deliver user data in frames, a baseband logical link instead of L2CAP channel will
be used. The baseband logical link provides a constant transport rate and fixed
intervals to transport data which is locked to the piconet clock [Gro13b].
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Preamble
1 octet
CRC
3 octets
PDU
2 ~ 39 octets
Access Address
4 octets
MSBLSB
Figure 2.4: BLE link layer packet format, adopted from [Gro13f]
2.2.4 Packet format
There is only one packet format in the BLE link layer for both advertising and data
communication. Figure 2.4 illustrates the link layer packet format.
• Preamble: the BLE receiver will use the preamble as frequency synchroniza-
tion.
Advertising channel: 10101010b.
Data channel: 10101010b or 01010101b.
• Access Address: it is used for BLE piconet communication derived from the
initiator’s address.
Advertising channel: Ox8E89BED6.
Data channel: A 32-bit random value generated by BLE device generated by
the initiator and transmitted in a connection request.
• PDU: There are two types of PDU in BLE, advertising channel PDU and data
channel PDU, which are illustrated by Figure 2.5 and 2.6.
• Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC): It will be calculated on the PDU in all
link layer packets and used to detect transmission errors. A packet with an
incorrect CRC should be rejected by the receiving device.
2.3 Advertisement
BLE communication has 40 physical radio channels and three of those are used as
advertising channels. In order to allow multiple BLE devices to share the same
advertising channels, a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) based polling scheme
is used by the devices to access a advertising channel at different time slots. In more
detail, physical channels of BLE advertising can be sub-divided into time units as
events, which include Advertising and Connection events. Consecutive events start
from the first advertising channel and then occur at regular intervals with a random
delay to count against transmission interference [Gro13i].
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TxAdd (1) RxAdd (2)RFULength (6)(1)(4)PDU Type RFU (2)
ADV_DIRECT_IND
ADV_IND
ADV_NONCONN_IND
SCAN_REQ
SCAN_RES
CONNECT_REQ
ADV_SCAN_IND
Reserved
0110
0101
0100
0011
0010
0001
0000
0111−1111
PDU type Packet name Description
connectable undirected
connectable directed
non−connectable undirected
scan request
scan response
scannable undirected
connect request
Header
16 bits
Playload
LSB MSB
Figure 2.5: BLE advertising PDU packet format, adopted from [Gro13f]
Header
16 bits
Playload
RFU (2)
MIC (32 bits)
LSB MSB
SN MD RFU Length(3) (5)(1)(1)NESN (1)LLID (2)
Figure 2.6: BLE data PDU packet format, adopted from [Gro13f]
Advertiser AdvertiserScanner AdvertiserAdvertiser AdvertiserScanner Advertiser AdvertiserScanner Initiator
Advertising Event
Adv channel(n) Adv channel(n+1) Adv channel(n+2) Adv channel(n)
Advertising session Advertising sessionAdvertising session
TDMA timeline
Advertising Event
Figure 2.7: BLE advertising event, adopted from [Gro13i]
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service dataadvertiser address
advertiser address service data
scanner address advertiser address
advertiser address scan response data
scannable undirected advertising event
non−connectable undirected advertising event
scan request
scan response
Figure 2.8: BLE PDU for non-connectable advertising events, adopted
from [Gro13g]
service dataadvertiser address
advertiser address initiator address
advertiser addressinitiator address connect request data
connectable directed advertising event
connectable undirected advertising event
connect request
Figure 2.9: BLE PDU for connectable advertising events, adopted from [Gro13g]
Figure 2.7 illustrates the typical BLE advertise events, two typical roles can
be involved in the events: advertiser and scanner. An advertiser can transmit
advertising packets about its general service on advertising PHY channels. The
devices that receive advertising packets without the intention to connect to the
advertiser are referred as scanner. Over the advertising channel, the scanner can
send scan requests to the advertiser for more detailed service information. The
advertiser will then respond to the requests by scan responses. Figure 2.8 illustrates
the different advertising PDU of a non-connectable advertising event.
As to connection events, a BLE device that listens for connectable advertisement
and then initiates a connection is referred to as an Initiator. Figure 2.9 illustrates
the different advertising PDU of connection event.
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beacon/probe response
authentication, build LL connection
pairing response
pairing request
pairing over SMP
establish security connection
with temporary keys from pairing
LTK distribution
Other keys distribution
generate session keys
Slave Master
security context is established
Figure 2.10: SMP in nRF51822 Evaluation chip, adopted from [Gro13l]
From figure 2.8 and figure 2.9, it can be seen that the adversary can fetch the
BLE addresses and service data from unprotected PDUs. This gives a big risk of
privacy disclosure and device tracking.
2.4 BLE security overview
In Bluetooth core specification 4.1, all the following BLE security mechanisms are
only used in connection mode and procedures. So the role of master and slave
will be used in following description. Even though the security mechanisms in the
connection mode can not directly apply to privacy enhancement over BLE advertising
channels, it still gives us the overview of BLE security mechanisms and helps to
conduct the following research for this project. To setup an encryption session, the
master and slave need to build up an encrypted link through pairing, then execute
key distribution in the encrypted link. Figure 2.10 illustrates a typical example about
how to set up a security context in BLE communication. Typical steps to establish a
bond between the master and slave can be boiled down to [Gro13l]:
• The BLE slave requests the master to initiate a pairing.
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• The master and slave exchange security properties.
• If the master supports the encryption mode required by the slave, security
manager of the master device will initiate security pairing.
• The output of pairing will be used to build up an encrypted link between the
master and slave.
• In the encrypted link, the key distribution will be executed between master
and slave devices.
• After getting the distributed keys, the master and the slave will update the
local bond database.
• Derive session keys from the distributed Long Term Key (LTK) and establish
security context for communication.
If there is a successful bond stored in the database locally for the master and slave,
reconnection can be encrypted, random addresses can be resolved, or the BLE
device can verify signed data between the master and slave. Table 2.1 shows key
definition in BLE and its usage. Identity Resolving Key (IRK) will be used for
privacy enhancement in section 4 system design.
Key Name Size(bit) Description
IRK identity resolving key 128 Generate and resolve random ad-
dresses, reduce the ability to
track a LE device
CSRK connection signature re-
solving key
128 Sign data and verify the signature
on the receiving device
LTK long term key 128 Generate the contributory session
key for an encrypted connection
EDIV encrypted diversifier 16 Identify the long term key, a new
EDIV is generated corresponding
to a unique LTK
Rand random number 64 Identify the long term key, a new
Rand is generated corresponding
to a unique LTK.
Table 2.1: Keys in BLE, adopted from [Gro13m]
After all the keys are available for both the master and slave, the Linker Layer (LL)
of the devices provides the mechanism of encryption, decryption, and authentication
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nonce counter
block cipher encryption
plaintext
ciphertext
keystream
Session key
(derived from LTK)
Figure 2.11: BLE PDU encryption, adopted from [Sta01]
by applying AES-CCM to Data Channel PDU with a non-zero length Payload. Then
24 bit CRC is appended on all packets for the purpose of verifying transmission
errors [Gro13j]. All the mechanisms ensure the maximum robustness for BLE against
malicious tampering and interference.
AES-CCM algorithm utilizes combination of nonce and counter to assure of
uniqueness of keystream for each PDU. Encryption of PDU is shown in figure 2.11,
the encryption blocks encrypt combination of a nonce and a counter with a session
key derived from the LTK to provide the keystream which is used to encrypt the
payload. The nonce will be deployed prior to the session and it is same for the whole
session. The local counter will be increased by one after encrypting a PDU. So it is
similar with a one-time pad stream encryption with higher security level. It means
different PDU are encypted by different keystreams.
As to decryption in the peer BLE device, the same operation will be done. The
peer device will encrypt combination of the nonce and counter with the negotiated
session key to output the keystream. And then the keystream will be Bitwise
Exclusive OR (XOR) with the received ciphertext. As encryption will consume less
computational resources compared with decryption, the way of decryption in BLE
device gives good performance to the whole BLE security system.
It is well known that encryption does not protect against malicious modification
of PDU. Thus, the counter-mode CBC-MAC are used to calculate the Message
Integrity Code (MIC) for integrity protection. The rules of CBC-MAC to construct
MIC is Ci = EK( Ci-1 ⊕ mi ). If plaintext is n blocks long, then the last 64 bits
is used as MIC. However, CBC-MAC is only secure for a fixed-length message. For
variable length messages, the following mechanism will be used : MIC = CBC-MAC
EK1(CBC-MACEK(variable-length message)). It means that final MIC is obtained
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IV
local counter
frame header PN 128 bits 128 bits 128 bitsdata datadata
AES(K)
AES(K) AES(K) AES(K) AES(K) AES(K)
AES(K1)
64 bits of output
MIC
128 bits
data
Figure 2.12: BLE PDU integrity protection, adopted from [Sta01]
by encrypting the output of CBC-MAC value with a new key K1. In terms of the
research of CBC-MAC [KI04], the mechanism of MIC is proved secure if K and K1
are two random keys. The MIC generation is shown in figure 2.12.
Chapter3Related work
In this chapter, firstly existing privacy features in Bluetooth core specification 4.1
will be described and analyzed. In connection mode and procedures, the existing
privacy features are used to reduce possibility of a BLE device being tracked. It
is very relevant to this project and within the scope of this research. Even though
the objective of this project is about connectionless advertisement, the existing
privacy features still give us basic understanding about privacy concern and handling
mechanism.
In following, next section will analyze the challenges to directly apply the existing
privacy features to BLE connectionless advertisement.
3.1 Existing BLE privacy features RPA and NRPA
In order to reconnect to a known BLE device and lower the risk of device being
tracked, privacy features have been defined in Bluetooth core specification 4.1. The
privacy features will change the device address on a frequent basis over a period of
time, such that adversary can not connect a static BLE address to a specific device.
However, the private features are not used in connectionless GAP mode, it is only
used in connection mode or during connection procedures [Gro13d].
3.1.1 Private address
The existing privacy features are only supported in connection mode and procedures.
It mainly focuses on address protection by using private address over the radio
channels. The private address is changed on a frequent basis and can be classified
into two types: NRPA and RPA [Gro13d].
In connection mode, a BLE device can use NRPA or RPA to reconnect to a known
device. NRPA and RPA looks random and is unpredictable, so it is impossible for
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1 0
MSB
random part of prand
LSB
hash(IRK, prand)
24 bits 24 bits
Figure 3.1: BLE RPA format, adopted from [Gro13e]
MSBLSB
0 0
48 bits
random part
Figure 3.2: BLE NRPA format, adopted from [Gro13e]
adversary to listen on the radio channels and link the random address to a specific
BLE device.
RPA
In Bluetooth core specification 4.1, the host of BLE device can generate 48-bit RPA
with the IRK and a 24-bit random number known as prand. After receiving the
generated RPA, the peer device will do exhaustive search in bond database for a
specific IRK. The IRK is used to identify the device which generated the RPA. The
rule to generate a RPA is shown by RPA = hash(IRK, prand) || prand. The format
of RPA is illustrated by figure 3.1.
NRPA
In connection mode and procedure, a BLE device can follow a specific rule to generate
a 48-bit NRPA and distribute to a peer device. Next time, the peer device can use
the NRPA to reconnect to the known BLE device. The format of NRPA is illustrated
by figure 3.2.
3.2 RPA and NRPA in BLE advertising context
As objective of this project is about privacy enhancement over the advertising
channels, the existing concept of RPA and NRPA will be put into BLE advertising
context and discussed. Prior to putting existing privacy features into BLE advertising
context, a typical BLE advertising scenario will be introduced. In following, how to
utilize the existing privacy features to protect BLE advertisement will be detailed.
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scanner
(mobile phone)( sensor)
advertiser
general broadcasting
scan
 reque
st
scan response
Figure 3.3: A BLE advertising scenario
3.2.1 A typical BLE advertising scenario
Figure 3.3 shows a typical BLE advertising scenario, two roles are involved: adver-
tiser(sensor) and scanner(mobile phone). The first message in the figure is that sensor
broadcasts general information over a BLE advertising channel. If the scanner wants
more service data from the advertiser, the second message in the figure are sent out
by the scanner. Lastly, the advertiser answers the scanner by a scan response.
3.2.2 Usage of RPA and NRPA in BLE advertisement
This section will make use of the advertising scenario of figure 3.3 to analyze the
usage of RPA and NRPA. The prerequisite of analysis and discussion is there must
be pre-stored bond database in both the advertiser and scanner.
• Privacy protection within BLE advertisement by RPA.
1. Following the rule in figure 3.1, the host of advertiser generates a RPA as
advertiser’s device address.
2. Then the advertiser can use the generated RPA to broadcast information
to the scanner over the advertising channels.
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3. After the host of scanner receives a advertising message with the RPA, it
will do exhaustive search to retrieve its local bond database for the IRKa
of the advertiser.
4. As soon as the scanner gets the IRKa, it can link the RPA with the
advertiser.
• Privacy protection within BLE advertisement by NRPA.
1. The host of scanner device generates a random NRPA and distributes it
to the advertiser in a connection session.
2. The advertiser stores the NRPA from the scanner in the local bond
database.
3. For a connectionless advertising session, the advertiser can use the stored
NRPA as its random address to advertise message to the scanner.
4. After the host of scanner receives an advertising message with the NRPA,
it will resolve the NRPA based on its local bond, and link the NRPA with
the advertiser.
In the same way, the privacy of advertising message from the scanner to the advertiser
can also be protected by RPA and NRPA. The scanner can generate a RPA by itself
and send advertising message with its RPA to the advertiser. As soon as receiving
the message with a RPA, the advertiser can resolve the RPA by exhaustive searching
IRKs of the scanner. As to NRPA protection for the scanner, the advertiser can also
distribute a NRPA to the scanner in a connection session, the scanner can use the
distributed NRPA to communicate with the advertiser during advertisement.
3.3 BLE privacy challenges
In terms of study in section 3.1.1, the existing privacy protection is on the basis
of BLE private address. The usage of private address does reduce the possibility
of device being tracked to some extent. However, device privacy still faces some
challenges over advertising channels. The following lists the privacy challenges within
BLE advertising channels under the protection of existing privacy features of RPA
and NRPA.
• The adversary can impersonate as the legitimate advertiser, replay the general
broadcasting message to the scanner, and elicit the scanner to send scan request.
The consequence is that the adversary can observe the advertising channels
and track the scanner in terms of responding location.
• The adversary can impersonate as the legitimate scanner, replay the scan
request to elicit answer from the advertiser, and track the advertiser.
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• service data within advertisement is plaintext. The adversary can also track
device by means of linking static service data with a specific BLE device.
• The adversary can do brute-force attacking by unlimitedly replaying the cap-
tured advertisement. In this way, he can consume bandwidth and power of
both the advertiser and the scanner unlimitedly.
The study of the Bluetooth core specification 4.1 conducted in this project has
given background knowledge, current research process, and privacy challenges in this
research area. Knowledge accumulated in this chapter is therefore used as the basis
of system design, with the intention to solve the challenges mentioned in section 3.3
and enhance the BLE privacy over the advertising channels.

Chapter4System design
Following the project objectives mentioned in section 1.3, this chapter confines
the overall system design to a complete privacy enhancement protocol over BLE
advertising channels. Section 4.1 defines privacy violation models based on the
communication analysis. Then section 4.2 determines functional requirements. In
following, the complete system design is proposed in section 4.3 and 4.4 on the basis
of the functional requirements. Lastly, optional functions for various BLE advertising
scenarios are given and explained in section 4.5.
4.1 Privacy violation models
In this section, prior to defining violation models, de facto communication over BLE
advertising channels will be presented. Violation models will be followed in the light
of analyzing advertising channels and message interaction over the channels.
4.1.1 Advertising analysis
As mentioned in Bluetooth core specification 4.1, there are 3 fixed physical channels
for BLE advertisement. Various advertising sessions can be conducted over BLE
advertising channels. In this project, a typical advertising session will be used as
example to define violation models. However, the violation models can be applied to
different kinds of advertising sessions.
A typical advertising session can be composed of 3 message exchanges, as illus-
trated in figure 4.1. Firstly, the BLE advertiser device broadcasts service data over
any of the fixed physical advertising channels. After getting the broadcast message,
the scanner device can send out a scan request for further detail information from
the advertiser device over the same advertising channel. Then the advertiser device
responds to the scan request by a scan response via the same advertising channel.
23
24 4. SYSTEM DESIGN
advertising scan request scan response
Advertiser Scanner Advertiser
Adv channel(n)
Advertising session
Figure 4.1: A typical BLE advertising session, adopted from [Gro13k]
Prior to defining violation models, there are assumptions described which are
relevant to the threats imposed to advertising channels by adversary. Advertising
messages will be exchanged via open radio channels and no connection is established
between the advertiser and scanner. Thus, in the BLE privacy violation models we
assume that adversary control all communication over physical advertising channels
between advertiser and scanner.
From a security perspective, it means that the adversary can not only observe
all the messages over the channels. But also he can replay, alter, forge advertising
messages and impersonate to be a legitimate communicating device.
Furthermore, advertising message may cause the leakage of the device identities,
position information and secret service data. The privacy leakage makes it possible
for the adversary to track the BLE devices with the help of the device identities and
other service data, e.g the adversary is able to track a mobile phone(scanner) or a
pacemaker(advertiser) in the light of device addresses within advertisement.
4.1.2 Violation models
In violation models, a distinction can be made between typical roles of BLE adver-
tisement: advertiser privacy violation and scanner privacy violation.
In the former case there are two different approaches for the adversary to violate
BLE advertiser’s privacy: privacy disclosure and device tracking.
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• Disclosing advertiser’s privacy by the following way:
1. The adversary passively listens to advertising channels to capture messages
with address and static service data of the advertiser. Then he analyzes
the captured messages and discloses the privacy of the advertiser, but not
much more than this.
• Tracking the advertiser by the following ways:
1. The adversary passively observes the channels for address and static service
data, connects the observed information with a specific BLE advertiser
device, and then tracks the advertiser.
2. The adversary actively pretends to be a legitimate scanner and replays a
captured scan request, elicits a scan response from the advertiser. Then
the adversary is able to track the responding advertiser by responding
location.
In the latter case, there are also two ways to violate BLE scanner’s privacy: privacy
disclosure and device tracking.
• Disclosing scanner’s privacy by the following way:
1. The adversary passively listens to the advertising channels to capture
messages with address and static service data of the scanner. Then he
analyzes the captured messages and discloses the privacy of the scanner,
but not much more than this.
• Tracking scanner by the following ways:
1. The adversary passively observes the channels for address and static service
data, connects the observed information with a specific BLE scanner device,
and then tracks the scanner.
2. The adversary with its stronger transmitter can do more than just observ-
ing all messages over the physical advertising channels. He can broadcast
the observed advertisement and pretend to be a legitimate advertiser in its
immediate vicinity, elicit the scanner to send a scan request. As soon as
the scanner device sends scan request to the fake advertiser, the adversary
need not crack content of the scan request and is able to track the scanner
in terms of responding location.
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4.2 Functional requirements
As the violation models mentioned in section 4.1.2, all the data communication
over the advertising channels in response will have risks of privacy leakage and
device tracking. The adversary can disclose the privacy of BLE devices by passive
observation. He can also track the devices by passive observation or actively replaying
the captured message to elicit response from the victim device.
In this project, it is desired to do two types of privacy protection: protection
against passively attacking, mainly focuses on advertisement confidentiality which can
be applied to address and static service data; protection against actively attacking,
mainly focuses on countermeasures against BLE device tracking.
It is expected, that existing countermeasures can be used to protect device privacy
and resist against device tracking, where unfortunately there is no such mechanism
in Bluetooth core specification 4.1. This leads to the necessity of functions which can
be applied to protect sensitive information and to resist against device tracking over
the advertising channels. Thus, the main functional requirements to BLE privacy
enhancement can be specified as:
• BLE advertiser’s privacy protection from the message confidentiality perspec-
tive.
• Keep BLE advertiser from being tracked, focus on the avoidance of static
ciphertext and countermeasures against replay attacking.
• BLE scanner’s privacy protection from the message confidentiality perspective.
• Keep BLE scanner from being tracked, focus on the avoidance of static cipher-
text and countermeasures against replay attacking.
The following section will detail how to solve and mitigate various privacy violations
in the light of functional requirements in section 4.2.
4.3 System architecture
This section will elaborate the system design from both stack perspective in overview
and separate sub-functional perspectives. Due to various BLE advertising scenarios,
some optional functions will be described later on.
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BLE controller
LINK LAYER
HCI (configuration command)
L2CAP
BLE host
1. Bonding and transfering keys.
4. Generating and resolving NRPA−Nonresolvable private addresses.
2. Set privacy flag and store privacy characteristics.
3. Generating and resolving RPA−Resolvable private addresses.
GAP, SMP, ATT
Applications/Profiles
Figure 4.2: Existing BLE privacy software stack in Bluetooth core specification
4.1, adopted from [Gro13m]
4.3.1 Protocol stack design
Existing privacy stack
In Bluetooth core specification 4.1, current privacy solution only involves BLE host
to protect device address, as illustrated in Figure 4.2. BLE host is responsible for
key distribution, privacy flag setting, and generating and resolving RPA and NRPA.
Enhanced privacy stack
The enhanced privacy protocol consists of an application interface and a background
service. The application provides interface to end-user who can enable or disable
the enhanced privacy protocol and select privacy level among different supported
privacy options. As to the background service, it involve two important parts: BLE
host and BLE controller, as illustrated in figure 4.3.
In the privacy enhancement protocol BLE host is responsible for privacy flag
setting, key distribution, and nonce deployment. The BLE controller will execute
all the concrete tasks for privacy protection, e.g. encryption and decryption of
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BLE controller
LINK LAYER
(Encrypting and decrypting advertisement, including address and service data)
HCI
L2CAP
(configuration command)
(Bonding, transfering keys and setting privacy flag)
BLE host
Applications/Profiles
GAP,SMP,ATT
Figure 4.3: BLE software stack of enhanced privacy feature, adopted from [Gro13m]
BLE advertisement, generating and resolving private address. The Host Controller
Interface (HCI) is responsible for connecting BLE host with controller.
In more detail, the privacy application will present a list of privacy options to
end-user when the BLE device is pairing with a peer device. If the enhanced privacy
is selected and supported by both communicating parties, all the following messages
over BLE advertising channels will be protected by the enhanced privacy protocol.
It means that the new protocol will protect all BLE advertising messages including
device addresses and service data. However, if either the BLE advertiser or the BLE
scanner stops the enhanced privacy protocol during advertisement, there will be a
warning message to end-user through the application interface and end-user need to
select other privacy options which can be supported by both the BLE advertiser and
scanner.
Difference between the existing and enhanced stack
The main difference of software stack between the enhanced privacy protocol and
existing privacy features of Bluetooth core specification 4.1, is significant improvement
for energy efficiency. The function of generating and resolving ciphertext is moved
from BLE host to controller. BLE host will be not waken up for generating and
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resolving ciphertext.
Moreover, the existing privacy protection in Bluetooth core specification 4.1
mainly focuses on the protection of device address. The enhanced privacy protocol
is able to protect the whole advertising message consisting of device address and
service data.
4.3.2 Processing flow
For the enhanced privacy feature, figure 4.4 demonstrates a flow chart of a complete
session over BLE advertising channels. During pairing with a peer device, a list of
possible privacy options presents to end-user who can choose a privacy protocol in
terms of communication requirements. If the peer device does not support a specific
privacy option, they will be warning of privacy not supported to the end-user. After
a successful pairing procedure, the BLE device is set to support a specific privacy
option. The reason for having different privacy options is to accommodate to various
peer devices with different privacy supports.
As shown in the figure 4.4, the pre-shared bidirectional symmetric keys IRKa and
IRKs, nonce Ra and Rs are used to resist on privacy disclosure and device tracking
over BLE advertising channels as mentioned in section 4.1.2. Nonce Ra assures
freshness of an advertising session. 3-way handshake protocol is utilized to deploy
the nonce Rs from the scanner to the advertiser. Then Rs is used to initialize the
local counters RX and TX on both the advertiser and scanner.
The first message in the 3-way handshake mechanism is a challenge Ra con-
catenated with its encryption by IRKa from the advertiser. Prior to handling the
challenge from the advertiser, the scanner will do exhaustive search to find correct
IRKa for the advertiser and then deploy a nonce Rs to the advertiser with the
protection of IRKs. The third message is confirmation to a successful deployment of
the nonce Rs. As soon as the nonce Rs is deployed successfully, the local counters
RX and TX of the advertiser and scanner devices can be initialized to be the nonce
Rs. Then all the following advertisement between the scanner and advertiser will be
protected by both the local counters RX and TX and the pre-shared keys IRKa and
IRKs. In default, a BLE device supporting enhanced privacy protocol will encrypt
both address and service data for any type of advertising messages.
4.3.3 The message structure
In most cases, it is quite realistic to build a new solution upon existing mechanisms.
The same to this project, the privacy enhancement protocol will also utilize the
existing BLE advertisement packet format. The overall packet format consists the
same fields as Bluetooth core specification 4.1, which consists of four fields, preamble,
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TX = Rs
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= local RX?
enhanced privacy flag.
active scanning
yes
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generate nonce Rs
send out response Ra, E(IRKs, Ra), E(Ra+1, Rs, IRKs) 
no
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support enhanced
privacy?
Advertiser host Advertiser LL Scanner LL Scanner host
choose other privacy features.
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privacy?
support enhanced
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Ra is correct? 
drop packet
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using Ra, E(IRKs, Ra), exhaustive search IRKs.
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using Ra, E(IRKa, Ra), exhaustive search IRKa.
decrypt E(IRKa, Rs+1, payload)
TX = Rs
RX = Rs
decrypt E(Ra+1,Rs, IRKs) to verify Ra and get Rs.
send out confirmation of Rs with advertising payload.
Ra, E(IRKa, Ra) || E(IRKa, Rs+1, payload)
Is Rs
correct?
exhaustive search IRKa
match?
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stop session.
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start advertising session with
enhanced privacy flag.
drop packet.
yes 
E(IRKa, [TX || payload])
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stop session.
Figure 4.4: BLE devices interaction of enhanced privacy protocol
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(privacy enhanced advertising PDU)
Figure 4.5: Packet structure of enhanced privacy feature, adopted from [Gro13g]
access address, PDU, and CRC. The fields preamble and access address have fixed
values for all the advertising messages. So, the focus of this project will be put on
the field PDU, which is divided into header and payload fields.
There are some modification in this enhanced privacy protocol compared to the
existing packet format. First, a new PDU type in the header is defined in this
project to indicate if the privacy enhancement feature is supported. Second, two
bits Reserved for Future Use (RFU) in the header are used to indicate different
packet types for the BLE privacy enhancement. The new packet types consist of
3-way handshake mechanism and advertising payload under the protection of privacy
enhancement. As soon as 3-way handshake protocol is conducted successfully to
deploy a nonce Rs, all the subsequent advertisement will then be put in the new
packet format under the protection of both the local counters and pre-shared IRK.
Figure 4.5 illustrates packet structure of advertisement in the privacy enhancement
protocol.
Table 4.1 details the value and description of different fields in the header of the
PDU. The enhanced PDU type is defined to be 0111 which indicates to support the
privacy enhancement protocol. The fields of packet type in the privacy enhancement
will be used to decide the specific packet types in the enhancement protocol, including
3-way handshake and more service data.(* 1 is defined by this project)
1new added flags in the PDU header
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Field name Value Definition
PDU Type 0111 PRIVACY_ENHANCEMENT_PDU *
packet type in privacy enhancement
00 challenge in 3-way handshake *
01 response in 3-way handshake *
10 confirm in 3-way handshake *
11 more service data in one session *
TxAdd
0 public address
1 private address
RxAdd
0 public address
1 private address
Length sizeof(payload) octets length of PDU payload
RFU 00 no definition
Table 4.1: Header definition of enhanced advertisement PDU, modified
from [Gro13g].
4.4 Functional design
4.4.1 3-way handshake for counter deploy
There is no replay prevention over advertising channels in Bluetooth core specification
4.1. Normally a solution with counter or timestamp can be used against replay
attacking. In terms of the specification all BLE advertisement will be conducted in
connectionless state. It means that there is no central clock for BLE devices to be
synchronized to. Thus, in this project a counter solution is selected against replay
attacking.
This project has proposed a solution with two counters. Both the advertiser and
scanner devices have two counters. One counter is for RX and another is for TX.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the 3-way handshake protocol designed by this project, which
is used to deploy a nonce Rs from the scanner to advertiser device. After successful
deployment of the nonce Rs, Rs will be used to initialize the counters RX and TX of
the advertiser and scanner.
As to detail in figure 4.6, the first message is a challenge Ra with its encryption
E(IRKa, Ra). The nonce Ra is used to assure freshness of the advertising session. In
principle, It should be always a new Ra to identify a new advertising session and Ra
should never be repeated.
The second message "Ra, E(IRKs, Ra), E(IRKs, Ra+1, Rs)" is used by the
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decrypt E     (Rs+1, payload), verify Rs.
IRKa
all the following advertisement traffic
will be protected by the local counters TX and RX.
Figure 4.6: 3-way handshake protocol to deploy nonce Rs
scanner to deploy a nonce Rs to the advertiser. The reason to use "Ra, E(IRKs, Ra)"
in the second message is that there is no address information for the advertiser to
identify the scanner in this phase. The advertiser will utilize "Ra, E(IRKs, Ra)" to do
exhaustive search for the correct IRKs, then decrypt "E(IRKs, Ra+1, Rs)" to verify
the Ra and extract the nonce Rs. The third message "Ra, E(IRKa, Ra), E(IRKa,
Rs+1, payload)" is used by the advertiser to confirm the nonce Rs to the scanner.
The same as the second message, the scanner will firstly do exhaustive search for the
correct IRKa in terms of Ra, E(IRKa, Ra) and then decrypt the cipher "E(IRKa,
Rs+1, payload)" to verify the nonce Rs. If Rs passes the verification, the scanner
can extract payload including service data from the advertiser.
Following a successful deployment of the nonce Rs, the TX and RX counters on
both sides are initialized to be Rs. The subsequent advertisement will be protected
by the counters from replay attacking and device tracking. As to counter store and
verification for advertiser and scanner, section 4.4.2 has detailed description.
Security provided by nonce Ra and Rs
In order to utilize existing RPA mechanism which can conduct exhaustive search for
correct pre-shared key of peer devices based on a plaintext and its corresponding
ciphertext, 24 bits has been chosen to be length of the nonce Ra and Rs in this project.
As mentioned before, Ra assures of freshness of an advertising session and every new
advertising session should use a new Ra. 24 bits Ra and Rs in this project are able to
make sure the security of the 3-way handshake protocol in BLE advertising context.
Prior to analysis security of the nonce Ra and Rs, typical non-connectable BLE
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Figure 4.7: BLE advertising interval, adopted from [Gro13k]
advertising interval shown in figure 4.7 will be introduced. The advertising session
in figure 4.7 is illustrated by figure 3.3. As to connectable advertising event, there
will be different advertising interval (20 millisecond) and advertising transactions,
which means that relevant parameters of following analysis shall be adjusted for
connectable advertising event. However, the mechanism how to evaluate security
of the nonce Ra and Rs is exactly same for non-connectable advertising event and
connectable advertising event. Influence of the nonces to non-connectable advertising
event will be elaborated in detail. The same mechanism can be applied to connectable
advertising event.
In figure 4.7, there are 3 fixed physical BLE advertising channels, 37, 38 and 39.
An advertising event maximally consists of 3 advertising sessions belonged to different
advertising physical channels. The same advertising session must be conducted in
the same physical channels. As to interval of advertisement, the minimum interval of
an advertising event is 100 millisecond. In extreme case there will be 3 advertising
sessions during 100 millisecond. Put 24 bits nonce Ra into the extreme advertising
case, Ra will be repeated around 155 hours. However, combination of 24 bits Ra
and Rs makes it infeasible for an adversary to find vulnerability to attack the
communicating BLE devices. The reasons are elaborated by following description.
The adversary can eavesdrop a whole advertising session of 3-way handshake
protocol over an advertising channel. Assuming that the advertiser and scanner
conduct advertising session continuously up to 155 hours, the same challenge Ra,
E(IRKa, Ra) shows up again within an advertising session. Then the adversary can
replay the eavesdropped second message "Ra, E(IRKs, Ra), E(IRKs, Ra+1, Rs)". The
legitimate advertiser will answer the replayed message by "Ra, E(IRKa, Ra), E(IRKa,
Rs+1, payload)". In advertiser’s answer, payload is normally dynamic service data
and the pre-shared key IRKa is kept from the adversary. It is infeasible for the
adversary to crack it and make further attack. Furthermore, BLE communication is
in the way of ad-hoc and it is not rare situation that the peer device moves out of
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range. In most cases it is impractical for the adversary to track continuous advertising
session up to 155 hours and replay the eavesdropped message in a correct time point
to the legitimate advertiser. Thus, 24 bits Ra will not lower the security of the whole
system.
On the other hand, the adversary can also replay the first message "Ra, E(IRKa,
Ra)", then the legitimate scanner will newly generate a 24-bit nonce Rs, encrypt
"(Ra+1, Rs)" by IRKs, and send to the advertiser. Due to no knowledge of IRKs
and dynamic Rs, the adversary can not do further attack. Therefore, combination of
24 bits Ra and 24 bits Rs is safe in BLE advertising context.
4.4.2 Counter store and verification
In this project, 24-bit has been used as counter length. The reason is that the 24-bit
counter can easily accommodate to BLE advertisement in ad-hoc and connectionless
mode. The two counters RX and TX are utilized on both the advertiser and scanner
devices. Combining the characteristics of BLE advertising communication with
processing speed, this project has used Random Access Memories (RAM) to store the
counters TX and RX of both advertiser and scanner. The disadvantage is that the
counters will disappear once power off. The advantage is that it is faster to update
the counters during advertisement compared with flash memory. Considering that
BLE advertisement is connectionless communication, it is not necessary to store the
counters from the previous session and every new advertising session will re-negotiate
counter. Therefore, the choice of RAM memory accommodates to BLE advertisement
and project requirements.
Here the counter verification will only be discussed in a perfect BLE advertising
environment. Section 4.4.3 will discuss how to verify counter in an advertising
environment with the potential risk of replay attack and packet loss. This project
defines the counters TX and RX as two global variables in the RAM of BLE device.
Real-time counter updating will be reflected by updating of variables. The variable
TX will be increased by one whenever a packet is sent out. Prior to handling a
packet, the variable RX will be used to verify the uniqueness of the received packet.
Counter TX in the received packet which is equal to local counter RX of the receiving
device is considered to be a valid counter. The local counter RX will be increased
by one after receiving a valid packet. However, if there is an invalid counter in the
received packet, the BLE device in receiving state will stop the advertising session
immediately.
4.4.3 Handle of out of synchronization
The two copies of the counters in the advertising devices can become unsynchronized
due to open radio communication channels. It might be replay attack from adversary
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or packet loss due to radio interference. The BLE advertisement is prone to influence
from other radio interference. Moreover, Counter out of synchronization is not rare
case when an advertising device sends message to a peer device which is out of range.
In order to make the BLE advertising communication as secure as possible this
project has designed a mechanism to handle the counters out of synchronization.
Characteristics of BLE radio system:
• In order to make solution more clear, the characteristics of BLE radio system
will be given firstly. The radio system of BLE is half-duplex system, which
means a BLE device will transfer between sending and receiving states and
can not do both at the same time. If a BLE device is in receiving state, its
radio system is strictly controlled by a timer to receive a packet over BLE
advertising channels. In terms of Bluetooth core specification, there is a fixed
duration Time Inter Frame Space (TIFS) 150 microsecond between messages
within an advertising session [Gro13k]. It means that if a BLE device is in
receiving state, its radio system will be turn on to receive packet every TIFS
(150 microsecond). If a packet arrives in another time point, the packet will be
ignored.
Solution of out of synchronization:
• Taking the BLE radio and advertising characteristics into consideration, the
solution in this project on how to verify counter in an BLE advertising environ-
ment with the potential risk of replay attack and packet loss will be elaborated.
As soon as the nonce Rs is deployed from the scanner to advertiser, the local
counters RX and TX of the advertiser and scanner will be initialized to be Rs.
Counter TX is used to send out a packet and counter RX is used to verify the
received packet. As how to prevent replay attack, if the counter TX in the
arrived packet is less than the local counter RX in the receiving device, the
packet will be treated as a replayed packet and the receiving device will stop the
advertising session immediately. On the other hand, in order to accommodate
packet loss, after the period TIFS if the BLE device in receiving state has
not received a packet, the device will automatically update counter RX by
increasing one. However, this accommodation will be limited to some extent,
without receiving a packet the counter RX of the device in receiving state will
be updated based on TIFS up to a pre-defined times (y). After (y) times, if
the device in receiving state still has not received a packet with counter TX
which is consistent with local counter RX, the device will stop the advertising
session directly.
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Figure 4.8: Handle of counter out-of-synchronization within BLE advertisement
session
Figure 4.8 illustrates if packets from the advertiser are lost less than (x<y) times,
the scanner will automatically increase its local counter RX by one. As soon as
packet loss is up to (y) times, the scanner will expect to receive a packet with counter
which is consistent with the local counter RX of the scanner. If not, the scanner
will stop the adverting session. A new 3-way handshake protocol will be invoked to
deploy a new Rs. The mechanism to handle counter out-of-synchronization can also
be applied to another advertising direction, it means that the advertiser is in the
receiving state.
4.4.4 Countermeasure against device tracking
Normally, there are two typical ways to track a BLE device. One is passively listening
the communication channels to figure out the connection between the observed static
data and specific devices. Another way of device tracking is that the adversary can
actively replay the eavesdropped data over the BLE advertising channels, elicit a
response from the victim device, and get the position to track it.
To put actively device tracking in the advertising scenario illustrated by figure
4.1, the adversary can impersonate as a scanner device and replay a scan request to
elicit a scan response from the advertiser. Then the adversary can track the victim
advertiser which responds to the replayed message immediately. Vice versa, the
adversary can also impersonate as the advertiser to elicit response from the scanner.
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Figure 4.9: Enhanced BLE RPA format, modified from [Gro13e]
In this project, encryption of counter and advertisement message avoids passively
device tracking by static address and service data. As to device tracking by eliciting
response from the communicating device, there is no such risk for the advertiser
device. As figure 4.6 shows that the advertiser will either use dynamic challenge
or be protected by both counter and corresponding IRK. Prior to responding every
message, the advertiser will assure authenticity of the communicating party. Tracking
a scanner device by eliciting a response will be detailed in section 4.5.2.
4.5 Optional protection
4.5.1 Protection only for device address
In some advertising scenarios, it is not necessary to protect data area of PDU. As
PDU type "connect request" shown in figure 2.9, it is no need to encrypt the field
"connect request data". Thus, the project also proposes how to only protect the
address field of the advertising device.
Enhance solution
When enhanced privacy protocol is selected in BLE device, the LL of the BLE device
will generate a RPA with the IRK and a 24-bit local counter TX which is updating
for every advertising message within the advertising session. The local counter TX
is initialized by the nonce Rs, which is deployed by 3-way handshake protocol from
the scanner to the advertiser. The rule of generating BLE private address in the
privacy enhancement protocol can be RPA = E(IRK, TX) || TX. The format of RPA
is illustrated in the figure 4.9.
Difference between existing and enhanced solution
Compared with existing private address feature explained in section 3.1.1, the main
difference of private address between the enhanced privacy and existing privacy
feature of Bluetooth core specification 4.1, is enhancement against replay attacking.
Local counter TX of BLE devices can be used to detect replayed message over the
BLE advertising channels. Due to local counter TX is updating for every advertising
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message within the advertising session, the address field in the advertising message
will be dynamic over the advertising channels. It is not feasible for the adversary to
replay the captured advertisement or track the BLE device by the address field.
4.5.2 Mitigation for scanner tracking
As mentioned in section 4.4.4, the discussion of this section will be limited to scanner
device tracking by eliciting a response from the scanner. For BLE advertising, in
most cases sensor will play the role of advertiser to broadcast service data and mobile
phone plays the role as scanner to get service data from a advertiser. If the adversary
can track a mobile phone, he can probably get more private information of the phone
and maybe track the person who owns the phone. Therefore, it is very important to
do study in detail about scanner tracking.
Problem description:
In 3-way handshake protocol of the enhanced privacy, the first packet "Ra, EIRKa(Ra)"
is just a challenge and there is no deployed counter to prevent replay attacking yet in
this phase. The adversary can eavesdrop it and replay it many times over advertising
channels. The scanner will answer the replayed message by sending Ra, EIRKs(Ra),
EIRKs(Ra+ 1, Rs). The adversary just observes the advertising channels, figures
out which device has responded to the replayed challenge, and then tracks it by
responding location. In this way, the adversary can track the scanner device without
cracking the encrypted message EIRKs(Ra+ 1, Rs).
Mitigation:
To lower the possibility of the scanner being tracked, the bonding procedure can
deploy a pre-defined number of times (z). It controls how many challenges in the
form of "Ra, EIRKa(Ra)" must be sent to the scanner in a specific order continuously
before the scanner deploys a nonce Rs to the advertiser. In this way, prior to sending
the message "Ra, EIRKs(Ra), EIRKs(Ra+1, Rs)" the scanner need to check multiple
challenges from the advertiser and those challenges must be in a pre-defined order
format. Figure 4.10 illustrates schematics of the mitigation for scanner tracking.
4.5.3 Mitigation of DoS
In a well-architected system, it is not reasonable to use bandwidth and power
capability for presenting replayed and forged message and determine if they are
valid. Unlimited verification for message authenticity at both advertiser and scanner
will have influence on power and radio system, which will lead to unpredictable
consequences.
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Figure 4.10: Mitigation for scanner tracking
Problem description:
As mentioned in section 4.3, the BLE privacy enhancement protocol makes use of
a 3-way handshake protocol to deploy a nonce Rs from the scanner to advertiser.
The first message in 3-way handshake protocol is a nonce Ra concatenated by its
encryption, so it is possible for an adversary to capture the first message and replay it
unlimitedly over the advertising channels. As soon as receiving the replayed message,
the scanner will check the validity of the replayed message and maybe respond to it.
Even though the adversary has no knowledge of pre-shared IRKs and can not disclose
the message from the scanner, the adversary can dramatically consume bandwidth
and power capability of the scanner device. Thus, there is a potential risk of DoS for
the scanner device which may be not able to handle other legitimate advertisers as it
should be.
Mitigation:
Unlimited replay will cause high workload and unnecessary power consumption.
Low power usage is critical in a BLE device and therefore a solution is proposed
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to mitigate the influence from unlimited replay. If the scanner device receives same
challenge messages up to a pre-defined number of times (n) 2 within a fixed period,
the radio system can choose to blackout for a short period in order to save power.
2n will be decided by experimental result.

Chapter5Simulation – modeling andprotocol validation
Simulation can be defined as the imitative representation of the functioning of
one system by means of the functioning of another system [Kha08]. It is a useful
methodology when we want to capture all the threats adversary might pose to security
protocol. Simulation model can be used to analyze and evaluate vulnerabilities of
a security protocol. Normally it is conducted by establishing analytical models,
verifying, and analyzing the model with respect to security requirements.
In this project, in addition to system design for the BLE privacy enhancement
protocol over advertising channels, a protocol simulation based study is also performed.
Prior to simulation, necessary assumptions will be made in order to conduct protocol
analysis. Then, simulator is utilized to simulate communicating scenarios and verify
the protocol in different granularities.
Firstly, this chapter gives an introduction for the simulation tool used in this
project, and method how to establish and verify security model. Then following
part covers protocol simulation and validation of the BLE privacy enhancement over
advertising channels.
5.1 Choice of simulation tool - Scyther
The goal of protocol simulation is to provide a methodology for the formal analysis
and verification of abstract protocols. In particular, simulation requires a simulator
with formal semantics, intuitive definitions of security properties, and efficient tool
support [CM12d]. The simulator should allow us to formally model black-box security
protocols, and define all possible behaviours of such protocols [CM12d].
For the sake of this project, the attention is confined to security protocol ver-
ification. Scyther security protocol verification tool is selected in this project as
simulator. The reasons for using Scyther are that it separates concerns of the protocol,
43
44 5. SIMULATION – MODELING AND PROTOCOL VALIDATION
distinguishes protocol description from their dynamic behavior, and explicitly defines
knowledge of adversary.
Support for formal definitions of both existing and new security properties with
minimum efforts makes Scyther very attractive for using. Verification of security
properties is original purpose of Scyther, combining with mechanism to customize
security properties for requirements makes Scyther even more powerful.
5.2 Scyther introduction
Scyther is a tool for security analysis of protocols under perfect cryptography as-
sumption. It presents simulation model by defining protocol behaviors and claiming
security properties. Protocol is executed in the model explicitly by means of runs
of role instances named agents and message interaction among the agents. Then
claiming event is able to integrate security properties into the protocol.
During simulating Scyther binds values to agents and handles parallel execution
of the security protocol. Claiming event is used to verify if the security protocol
satisfies all the claimed security properties according to the messages they received
from a local perspective on the state of the system. If there is vulnerability in the
protocol and the role in the protocol does not fulfill the claimed security properties,
threat model is presented to illustrate the weakness.
Scyther is also capable of modeling security protocols in black-box by defining all
possible behaviors of an adversary [CM12d]. It means that there is already a perfect
cryptographic scheme in the underlying system. The perfect cryptographic scheme
is used as baseline to build up a secure protocol. The communicating message in
the protocol are treated as just abstract terms, the adversary can gain the complete
message by having a secret key or he learns nothing [CM12d].
The following part of this section will introduce the semantics, working mechanism,
and ways of model establishment and verification of Scyther.
5.2.1 Scyther runs
Scyther can describe message communication among a set of roles by run which
guide the interaction of actual agents in a system. When a protocol is executed,
each agent can execute any role any number of times in parallel. We call each such a
single execution of a role a run. In Scyther model, two runs executed by the same
agent are independent and no shared variables. Roles can be instantiated multiple
times in several runs [CM12c]. In order to instantiate a role we have to bind the
role names to the names of actual agents, and we have to ensure that the freshly
generated values are unique for each run.
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5.2.2 Security properties
Scyther integrates the security properties into the
protocol specification by means of claim events.
The main idea behind claim events is locality: role
instance agents have a local view on the system
state in terms of the messages they receive. The
protocol should guarantee that, the agent can be
sure about some properties of the global state of
the system in a local perspective [CM12e], e.g. a
secret key is not in the adversary knowledge, or
that a certain agent is active.
synchronisation
Injective 
Injective agree
synchronisation
Non−injective 
agree
Non−injective 
Figure 5.1: Security property hi-
erarchy, adopted from [CM12e]
The following part of this section will present several important security properties
of Scyther, which will be used in the BLE privacy enhancement protocol. Figure 5.1
depicts the hierarchy of authentication properties [CM12e].
• Secrecy : an adversary can not reveal information over an untrusted network.
• Authentication : a way to verify user’s identity as a communication partner
claims to be.
1. Aliveness : the property has requirement for the communication partner,
without putting restrictions on the contents of the communication.
2. Synchronisation : the property has requirement for the communication
contents which are indeed sent and received by the communication partners
as specified by the protocol description.
3. Non-injective Synchronisation : everything intended to happen in
the protocol description happens in the trace. It makes sure that the
protocol will be executed as expected if no adversary were present. Agents
may communicate with the same agents in multiple runs and later the
adversary may be able to replay packets from one session in another
session. Thus, a protocol with non-injective synchronization is vulnerable
to replay attacks.
4. Injective Synchronisation : multiple protocol executions are performed
as expected. There will be an injective mapping from claiming initiator
runs to corresponding responder runs. More precisely, different instances
of the initiator claim must correspond to different runs of the responder.
5. Message Agreement : requires that the contents of the received packets
will be exactly same with the sent packets as specified by the protocol
after the execution of the protocol.
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5.2.3 Threat model
Scyther assumes the adversary control all communication between the parties. The
adversary can eavesdrop all the messages over the communication channels. He can
also replay, reroute, and forge any messages. In a worse case, the adversary can
compromise a valid agent and participate communication of the protocol on behalf
of the valid agent [CM12b].
Scyther uses protocol assumption as baseline, analyzes security protocol, and
evaluates if the protocol fulfills all the claimed security properties. If there is any
vulnerability in the protocol, threat model will be used to demonstrate the message
flow how the adversary crack the communication among the legitimate parties.
5.3 BLE privacy enhancement
In terms of system design in chapter 4, a protocol simulation will be conducted
in the following section. Firstly, the assumption of the protocol simulation will be
introduced as baseline of the whole simulation. Then protocol simulation, analysis
and validation will be shown in detail.
5.3.1 Model assumptions
In the following, the assumptions are made in order to confine simulation and analysis
of the BLE privacy enhancement protocol in a stable and reliable circumstance:
• The underlying cryptographic mechanism between BLE advertiser and scanner
device is secure, e.g AES-CCM encryption and decryption. In reality this
assumption is depending upon the number of real-time messages the adversary
can eavesdrop over the radio channels and the computational resources.
• Bidirectional symmetric keys IRKa and IRKs are only shared between BLE
advertiser and scanner device and are kept from the adversary.
• The BLE communicating channels is purely open channels and is under full
control of the adversary.
In following, the assumptions will be used as baseline to do protocol simulation and
validation.
5.3.2 Simulation
Figure 5.2 depicts the protocol simulation for BLE privacy enhancement. Prior to
message exchange there will be bidirectional symmetric keys IRKa and IRKs shared
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between the advertiser A and scanner S. The message encryption is denoted by
{|m|}IRK.
The message exchange of protocol simulation will follow the definition of system
design in section 4.3. Generally speaking, the BLE privacy enhancement utilizes a
3-way handshake protocol, which assures freshness of advertising session and deploys
a freshly generated nonce Rs from BLE scanner to advertiser. The nonce Rs will
be used to initialize local counters which can protect following message exchange
between advertiser and scanner.
As illustrated in figure 5.2, in order to simulate the protocol, two agents of
role advertiser and scanner are defined and initiated. Firstly, the advertiser agent
generates a fresh nonce Ra and sends it together with its encryption by the pre-shared
key IRKa to the scanner. As soon as the scanner receives the message which passes a
local checking, he will generates a fresh nonce Rs, then send Rs and confirmation of
Ra encrypted by the pre-shared IRKs, to the advertiser. The next step will be that
the advertiser extracts the nonce Rs and confirms the received Rs to the scanner.
The result of the protocol running is both the agent advertiser and agent scanner
have the knowledge of the nonce Rs and assure its authenticity.
During protocol execution, the agent advertiser and agent scanner satisfy all
the security claims showed in the figure 5.2. In particular, the properties ni-agree,
ni-synch, and alive have been hold, which stands for authentication in the form of
non-injective synchronization, non-injective agreement and alive. The detail of the
security claims has been explained in section 5.2.2.
5.3.3 Analysis of security property
The protocol in figure 5.2 deploys a nonce Rs securely from the scanner to advertiser
and satisfies the security properties ni-synch and ni-agree.
In the protocol, every receive event of message is preceded by a corresponding
send event. Without sending request for Rs, the advertiser device will not accept
and handle the message from the scanner device which consists of a Nonce Rs. In
the same way, the agent of scanner also receives and sends out messages in a fixed
order as specified in the protocol. If a message arrives out of order, the agents of the
protocol will just ignore it. As the ni-synch property requires the corresponding send
and receive messages executed in the expected order of a protocol, so the agents of
the advertiser and scanner satisfy the security claim of ni-synch.
As to ni-agree property, it requires the content of the corresponding send same
with the receive messages. In the protocol, the message exchange of 3-way handshake
protocol is protected by the pre-shared keys IRKa and IRKs. As mentioned in the
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assumption of the protocol in section 5.3.1, the keys are known only by the advertiser
and scanner. So the adversary can only observe the messages over the BLE advertiser
channels and can not modify the messages to resend them. After deploying the nonce
Rs from the scanner to advertiser successfully, all the advertiser message will be
protected by both the pre-shared keys and local counters. It is also infeasible for the
adversary to tamper the captured message and resend it.
Therefore, the protocol is both ni-synch and ni-agree. As to injectivity property,
it is a higher-order property. That means that it is not possible to identify all attacks
on injectivity by a finite set of patterns. Scyther uses a different approach for the
verification of injectivity. In particular, Scyther has syntactically established and
verified that LOOP is a sufficient condition to guarantee injectivity for protocols that
satisfy NI-SYNCH [CM12f].
The following will analyze injectivity of the BLE privacy enhancement over
advertising channels. As 24-bit nonce Ra and Rs is used in the system design of
this project, 24-bit Ra will be repeated around 155 hours in the worst case of BLE
advertisement. In order to make protocol analysis we can assume that there are
continuously advertising sessions up to 155 hours between a BLE advertiser and
scanner. If an adversary can capture all the advertisement and wait for a repeated
challenge "Ra, E(IRKa, Ra)" from the advertiser, the adversary can then replay
the captured "Ra, E(IRKs, Ra), E(IRKs, Ra+1, Rs)" to the advertiser. From the
advertiser’s local perspective, the replayed message is legitimate and the advertiser
will answer the replayed message. Therefore, in principle 24-bit nonce Ra makes the
protocol not fulfill injectivity. It means the adversary can capture all the advertising
sessions, wait for Ra to be repeated, and then replay an eavesdropped message
from previous session which the legitimate device can not distinguish. However, it
is infeasible for adversary to attack BLE advertising devices in ad-hoc mode, the
detailed reasons are elaborated in section 4.4.1.
5.3.4 Validation
Generally there will be infinitely possible protocol traces. However, there are a lot
of similar protocol traces from the perspective of security verification. Thus, the
simulation in this protocol will use trace pattern to represent a class of traces which
is defined as a set of message exchange in order.
Scyther tool already implements an algorithm to analyze security properties based
on trace pattern of a protocol. The algorithm is constructed upon the analysis of
trace patterns, which represent sets of message exchange in order. So the necessary
trace properties will be used to evaluate the claimed security properties. e.g. Order
of message exchange, occurrence of agent events, the adversary knowledge and so on.
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Figure 5.2: BLE privacy enhancement protocol, adopted from [CM12a]
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Figure 5.3: BLE privacy enhancement protocol verification
As figure 5.3 illustrates that following the specified protocol trace the privacy
enhancement protocol satisfies all the claimed security properties. The nonce Rs is
deployed from the scanner to advertiser securely and fulfill all the claimed security
properties. The message exchange between the advertiser and scanner fulfills the
Non-injective Synchronization as well as Non-injective Agreement. That indicates
that the protocol is executed exactly as it would be and both the advertiser and
scanner agree on that the content of the received message correspond to the sent
messages which is specified by the protocol.
In the following chapter protocol implementation in Cortex-M0 platform will be
described. The whole chapter covers how to establish developing environment for
practical experiments, and also complete coding implementation. The system design
and simulation model of BLE privacy enhancement protocol will be examined in
more depth.
Chapter6Implementation
One of the research methods stated in section 1.4 is to implement the system design
and demonstrate the enhanced privacy protocol. This chapter gives a detailed
description of implementation for the privacy enhancement protocol. First, it is
essential to have a thorough overview about the experimental environment of the
implementation, including software environment setup and hardware connection used
for this project. Second, functionalities described in system design section 4.4 will be
implemented in detail. In order to make implementation more understandable, some
code snippet from the most important features have been included.
6.1 Environment setup
6.1.1 Hardware setup
The laboratory used during this project consisted of two identical nRF51822 BLE
chips to implement the system design as scanner and advertiser in Chapter 4. Both
nRF51822 chips are built around a 32-bit ARM® Cortex™ M0 CPU with 256kB
flash + 16kB RAM [Sem13b]. As figure 6.1 shows USB cables will be connected
to both boards for power supply and serial terminal readout. J-Link was used to
program the nRF51822 BLE chips.
In this project there are two ways to assist program and debug. Firstly debug
Graphical User Interface (GUI) running in the development computer shows running
result in user terminal and helps user to debug. Secondly Bluetooth sniffer BPA500
is able to capture the packets in the air between the advertiser and scanner, and it
can disassembler the captured packets to a a readable format. Figure 6.2 illustrates
the overview of experimental setup for this project implementation.
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Figure 6.1: The schematics of the boards connection, adopted from [Sem13b]
scanner
advertiser
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Figure 6.2: Experimental setup
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6.1.2 Software installation
All the software development has been done in windows 7, this section will introduce
how to set up developing environment for nRF51822 BLE chip in the windows
platform.
• Keil MDK-ARM Lite v4.54 : nRF51822 BLE chips programming Integrated
Development Environment (IDE).
• J-Link Software v4.56 : upload program into nRF51822 BLE chips.
• nRF51822 Software Development Kit : develop firmware on application micro-
controllers used with the nRF51822.
• S110 nRF51822 SoftDevice : BLE stack.
• S110 SoftDevice programming tools : upload program into nRF51822 BLE as
stack code.
6.2 Implementation
Following functional design of the BLE privacy enhancement in section 4.4, detailed
implementation will be elaborated in this section.
6.2.1 Nonce Rs deploy
Section 4.4.1 described system design for 3-way handshake protocol which deploys a
nonce Rs from scanner to advertiser. Here will focus on packet structure and detail
the deployment of nonce Rs in three steps. The 3-way handshake packets will be
constructed based on the packet definition in section 4.3.3. In particular, the fields
"PDU type" and "packet type in privacy enhancement" will be used to determine if a
packet is a 3-way handshake packet.
First message - Ra,EIRKa(Ra)
Figure 6.3 illustrates how to construct the first message in 3-way handshake pro-
tocol. The first message is a nonce Ra and its encryption from the advertiser. In
nRF51822 stack, there is already existing RPA mechanism to do exhaustive search
for the correct IRK in the field "AdvA" based on a plaintext and corresponding
ciphertext. Thus, the first message "Ra,EIRKa(Ra)" will be put into the field of
"AdvA" in PDU payload directly. As soon as receiving a message is privacy enhance-
ment PDU 0111 and packet type indicates a challenge of 3-way handshake protocol,
the scanner device will do exhaustive search for IRKa. If there is a IRK in the
bonding database of scanner, the scanner will prepare an answer to the advertiser.
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Figure 6.3: Packet structure of 3-way handshake challenge, modified from [Gro13g]
bool ll_adv_3way_handshake_challenge_generate()
{
static nrf_ecb_hal_data_t block_config;
(void)soc_rand_lowerstack_vector_get(&challeng_in_3way_handshake[0],
LL_ADV_RANDOM_LENGTH_PRA_ENHANCE);
m_revcpy( &block_config.key[0], &irk_in_advertiser[0], SOC_ECB_KEY_LENGTH);
m_revcpy( &block_config.cleartext[0], random_number_PRA,
SOC_ECB_CLEARTEXT_LENGTH);
soc_ecb_block_encrypt(&block_config);
memcpy(challeng_in_3way_handshake, random_number_PRA,
LL_ADV_RANDOM_LENGTH_PRA_ENHANCE );
memcpy(challeng_in_3way_handshake+LL_ADV_CIPHER_LENGTH_PRA_ENHANCE,
&block_config.ciphertext[0], LL_ADV_CIPHER_LENGTH_PRA_ENHANCE);
return true;
}
Second message - Ra,EIRKs(Ra), EIRKs(Ra+ 1, Rs)
As soon as the first message passes the verification in the scanner device, the scanner
will construct the message "Ra,EIRKs(Ra), EIRKs(Ra + 1, Rs)" to the advertiser
device. The nonce Rs is deployed to the advertiser and used as replay prevention
on both sides over the advertising channels. In order to make it possible for the
advertiser device to make use of existing RPA mechanism to exhaustively search for
IRKs of the scanner, the scanner device puts Ra,EIRKs(Ra) in the field "ScanA".
In following, EIRKs(Ra+ 1, Rs) in the field of "payload".
As soon as receiving the message, the advertiser device will do exhaustive search for
IRKs of the scanner in terms of Ra,EIRKs(Ra). If correct IRKs is found in the bond-
ing database of advertiser, the advertiser will use the IRKs to decrypt the ciphertext in
the field of "payload" and initialize the local counter RX and TX by the nonce Rs. Fig-
ure 6.4 illustrates how to construct the second message in 3-way handshake protocol.
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Figure 6.4: Packet structure of 3-way handshake response, modified from [Gro13g]
bool ll_scan_3way_handshake_Rs_deploy_cipher_generate(void)
{
static nrf_ecb_hal_data_t block_config;
uint8_t concatenation_Ra1_RS_scanner[LL_SCAN_RA1_RS_LENGTH];
(void)soc_rand_lowerstack_vector_get(&deployed_counter_from_scanner[0],
LL_SCAN_DEPLOY_RS_LENGTH);
memcpy( concatenation_Ra1_RS_scanner, challeng_from_advertiser,
LL_CHALLENGE_FROM_ADV_LENGTH );
memcpy( concatenation_Ra1_RS_scanner + LL_CHALLENGE_FROM_ADV_LENGTH,
deployed_counter_from_scanner, LL_SCAN_DEPLOY_RS_LENGTH );
ll_xor_encrypt_fast(&concatenation_Ra1_RS_scanner[0], SOC_ECB_CIPHERTEXT_LENGTH,
(void*)&keystreamScan_of_Ra_session);
return true;
}
Third message - Ra,EIRKa(Ra), EIRKa(Rs+ 1, [servicedata])
As to the third message in 3-way handshake protocol, it is confirmation of Rs from
the advertiser to scanner device. The field "AdvA" is used to put the Ra,EIRKa(Ra),
which can be used by the scanner device to exhaustively search for the correct IRKa
of the advertiser device. As soon as finding the correct IRKa, the scanner device
decrypt the ciphertext in the field "payload". After decryption, the scanner device
will first verify correctness of the Rs. If Rs is correct, the scanner device will read
the following service data.
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Figure 6.5: Packet structure of 3-way handshake confirm, modified from [Gro13g]
bool ll_scan_3way_confirm_from_advertiser_generate(void)
{
ll_xor_encrypt_fast(&deployment_from_scanner[0] ,
SOC_ECB_CIPHERTEXT_LENGTH, &keystreamScan_of_Ra_session[0]);
if(memcmp(&deployment_from_scanner[0], &challeng_in_3way_handshake[0],
LL_ADV_RANDOM_LENGTH_PRA_ENHANCE) == 0)
{
memcpy(&deployed_Rs_from_scanner[0],
&deployment_from_scanner[LL_ADV_RANDOM_LENGTH_PRA_ENHANCE],
LL_ADV_RANDOM_LENGTH_PRA_ENHANCE);
}
memcpy(&advertiser_payload[0], &deployed_Rs_from_scanner[0], RS_LENGTH);
ll_xor_encrypt_fast(&advertiser_payload[0], SOC_ECB_CIPHERTEXT_LENGTH,
(void*)&keystreamAdv_of_Ra_session);
return true;
}
6.2.2 Counter store and update
The nRF51822 chip has has a 32-bit memory space and separate memory types for
program and data connected with distinct buses, and each memory type has its
own address space. Such a memory architecture allows the processor to access both
program and data memories at the same time [Sem13a]. In more detail, there are
three main categories of memory in nRF51822 : internal flash (code memory), RAM,
and peripheral registers. Internal flash is non-volatile memory, which will not lose its
contents when power-off. RAM and peripheral registers are volatile memory.
In section 4.4.2 counter’s location and update has also been designed. Combining
the executing performance and BLE advertising characteristics, RAM memory is
selected. Figure 6.6 shows that real-time updating of the local counter TX and RX
will be executed in the RAM area. The counter RX and TX will be defined as two
global variables in the program, which will be located in the RAM memory. Prior to
handling a packet, the device will firstly check the packet number in the received
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Figure 6.6: Memory map for counter store, adopted from [Sem13a]
packet by the variable RX value. On the other hand, the variable TX value will also
be appended to a packet before sending out.
6.2.3 Handle of out-of-synchronization
The simplest way to prevent replay attacks is to discard any received packet in which
the counter has not increased by one compared to the last successfully received
packet. If this simplest way is used as countermeasure against replay attack in the
context of BLE advertisement, every single packet loss will invoke a 3-way handshake
protocol. However, packet loss is not rare situation when a advertiser sends packets
to a scanner out of range. Therefore, in terms of system design in section 4.4.3 a
mitigation is implemented to accommodates BLE advertisement to normal packet
loss.
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Figure 6.7: Schematics to mitigate packet loss over the BLE advertising channels
As mentioned in section 4.4.3, BLE radio system is half-duplex system which
means that a BLE device will in a receiving state or sending state, but not both at
the same time. The device in the sending state will concatenate a local counter TX
to send a packet and then update the TX by increasing by 1. On the other side,
the device in the receiving state will firstly verify the received packet with its local
counter RX and then process the packet in terms of result of the verification. In
order to accommodate to the packet loss over BLE advertising channels, a mitigation
will be implemented for BLE device in receiving state. Detailed scheme is illustrated
by the figure 6.7.
As soon as the nonce Rs is deployed from the scanner to advertiser, the local
counter RX and TX of the advertiser and scanner will be initialized to be Rs. Counter
TX is used to send out a packet and counter RX is used to verify the received packet.
Taking the characteristics of BLE radio in section 4.4.3 into consideration, if the
BLE device in the receiving state has not received a packet after the period TIFS,
the device will automatically update counter RX by increasing one. This behavior
will be done automatically up to (5) 1 times. After (5) times, if the device in the
receiving state still has not received a packet with a counter which is consistent with
1pre-defined number 5 is used in experimental environment of this project, it can be adjusted in
terms of different requirements
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the local counter RX, the device in receiving state will stop the advertising session
immediately. The control processing will return and the device in the receiving state
stop to listen to the advertising channel. If a new advertising session is required, a
3-way handshake protocol will be invoked and a new nonce Rs will be deployed to
initialize local counters.

Chapter7Future work
This project implemented a demonstration of the privacy enhancement protocol
in nRF51822 chips, which prevents privacy leakage and device tracking of BLE
devices over advertising channels. All the security implementations are limited
to the demonstration of the protocol designed. Thus, stable functions are more
important than other aspects. Next phase of the privacy enhancement can have
further improvements and provide more user-friendly GUI.
7.1 Future functionality
The demonstration of the system design proposed in Chapter 4 has focused on the
most critical functionalities which are sufficient for the privacy enhancement protocol.
The optional functionalities in section 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 have been omitted.
First of all, mitigation against DoS in section 4.5.3 is an improvement for perfor-
mance of the system. The consideration in this phase of the project will be put more
weight on a functional and secure protocol in a realistic environment. Thus, the
mitigation will be postponed to the future. Moreover, the current system design has
also proposed the mitigation for scanner tracking proposed in section 4.5.2. If some
applications have higher security requirement against scanner tracking, the mitigation
for scanner tracking can be implemented in the specific applications. However, the
ability to completely prevent scanner tracking has to be designed and implemented
in the future.
7.2 User interface
There must be some adjustment and improvement to be made in current demonstra-
tion with regard to user-friendly GUI. In order to be more modularize and integrated
into the existing BLE stack easily, all the functionalities of this demonstration have
been merged into the link layer. In current phase of the project, all the programming
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debug and function scheduling has been done through a dummy host. However,
the code of the dummy host is only accessible for the engineers who can access
the internal source code. For a user-friendly protocol, the whole stack should be
implemented to uphold a seamless end-user experience and implementation detail
should be kept away from the end-user. So, the next phase of this project should
add more interfaces in end-user’s GUI, and also more commands in HCI layer. The
end-user just need to select privacy options in the user GUI, then commands will go
through HCI and are directed to the link layer for execution of privacy protection
over the advertising channels.
7.3 Thorough test
As mentioned before, it is hard to predict and emulate all the attacking scenarios over
the BLE advertising channels precisely. So a more comprehensive test environment
should be set up and thorough tests are needed, which will improve the system
reliability and performance. Based on the thorough tests in the future, the parameters
in the program may be adjusted, including pre-defined number of times to allow
packet loss without re-invoking 3-way handshake protocol.
Chapter8Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the work accomplished through the whole project. The
project has focused on design, simulation and implementation of a BLE privacy
enhancement over the BLE advertising channels. The main focus has been put on
the message confidentiality, replay prevention, and anti-tracking of devices over the
advertising channels. Due to lack of central clock, the privacy enhancement utilizes
a counter solution instead of timestamp as countermeasure against replay attack and
device tracking.
All security features designed and implemented as part of this project are using
Bluetooth core specification 4.1 as baseline, which already includes bonding, key
distribution, and AES-CCM mechanisms. The project starts with a background
chapter. In following, system design of the enhanced privacy protocol has been
conducted. Then Scyther security protocol verification tool is selected as simulator to
verify the protocol and claimed security properties. In order to implement and test
functionalities, a realistic environment has been set up. It consists of two nRF51822
chips which work as advertiser and scanner to communicate over BLE advertising
channels. All the implemented functionalities have been verified based on system
design in section 4.
In this thesis work, a number of achievements have been made:
• First of all, a pre-study of BLE has been performed from different perspectives,
which are: core system architecture, data transport, advertisement, and the
overview of existing security mechanisms. Related techniques are grouped
together by the pre-study to give hints to functional requirements which are
critical for system design. Furthermore, the pre-study also provides overview
about how to integrate the new designed protocol into the existing BLE stack.
• Secondly, privacy violation models and functional requirements has been made
in terms of BLE pre-study. In following, system design has been elaborated
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from stack, processing flow and message structure perspectives. The detailed
functions cover a 3-way handshake protocol to deploy a nonce Rs from the
scanner to the advertiser, which is used to initialize local counters RX and
TX on both the advertiser and scanner. Furthermore, handling of out-of-
synchronization, countermeasure against device tracking, and mitigation for
DoS has also been designed.
• The third achievement made in this work is simulation of the privacy en-
hancement protocol. Scyther simulates the privacy enhancement protocol and
establishes analytical models. It is very useful especially in this case because the
analytical models could verify the privacy enhancement under various dynamic
attacking scenarios.
• After performing protocol simulation and verification, a realistic environment
has been setup with two nRF51822 chips as advertiser and scanner to implement
and test a demonstration of the system design. The whole implementation has
been added in the link layer of BLE stack. The advantage in its favor is it
being more modularized and has less influence on other subsystems. It eases
implementation, maintenance, functional integration, and test.
The most important areas that can be improved in the future are mentioned in
chapter 7. In accordance with system design, multiple of the goals were reached. The
output of code is a complete privacy enhancement demonstration with confidentiality
protection, replay prevention, and anti-tracking of device. I feel that the whole
research has been conducted following the research method in section 1.4 and the
goals of this project have been reached.
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ChapterAAppendix
A.1 Modeling protocol-BLE privacy enhancement
In this appendix, I have included code of Scyther for this project.
1 /*
2 Nonce Rs deployment protocol
3 */
4
5
6 // User type declaration
7 const increaseByOne: Function;
8
9 // bidirectional symmetric keys between advertiser and scanner
10 macro kir = k(I,R);
11 macro ksr = k(R,I);
12
13
14 // Protocol description
15 protocol ns3(I,R)
16 {
17 role I
18 {
19 fresh Ra: Nonce;
20 fresh serviceData: Nonce;
21 var Rs: Nonce;
22
23 send_1(I,R, Ra, {Ra}kir );
24 recv_2(R,I, Ra, {Ra}ksr, {increaseByOne(Ra), Rs}ksr);
25 send_3(I,R, Ra, {Ra}kir, {increaseByOne(Rs),serviceData}kir);
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26
27 claim(I,Secret,Rs);
28 claim(I,Alive);
29 claim(I,Niagree);
30 claim(I,Nisynch);
31 }
32
33 role R
34 {
35 fresh Rs: Nonce;
36 var Ra: Nonce;
37 var serviceData: Nonce;
38
39 recv_1(I,R, Ra, {Ra}kir );
40 send_2(R,I, Ra, {Ra}ksr, {increaseByOne(Ra), Rs}ksr);
41 recv_3(I,R, Ra, {Ra}kir, {increaseByOne(Rs),serviceData}kir );
42
43 claim(R,Secret,Rs);
44 claim(R,Alive);
45 claim(R,Niagree);
46 claim(R,Nisynch);
47 }
48 }
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A.2 Code
In order to comply with non-disclosure agreement with Nordic Semiconductor, this
appendix has only included part of code of this project.
A.2.1 Scanner
1 bool le_initilize_keystream_to_decrypt_advertiser()
2 {
3 static nrf_ecb_hal_data_t block_config;
4 memset(&challeng_from_advertiser[0], 0xab, 3);
5 m_revcpy( &block_config.key[0], &irk_peer_advertiser[0],
6 SOC_ECB_KEY_LENGTH);
7 m_revcpy( &block_config.cleartext[0], challeng_from_advertiser,
8 LL_CHALLENGE_FROM_ADV_LENGTH);
9 soc_ecb_block_encrypt(&block_config);
10 memcpy(&key_stream_for_advertiser_decryption[0],
11 (void*)&block_config.ciphertext[0],
12 LL_ADVERTISER_KEYSTREAM_LENGTH);
13 return true;
14 }
15
16 void le_xor_encrypt_fast(uint8_t *nonce, size_t len,
17 uint8_t key[KEY_LENGTH])
18 {
19 // key is a 16-byte xor key
20 size_t i;
21 for(i = 0; i < len; i++)
22 nonce[i] ^= key[i % 16];
23
24 }
25
26 bool scanner_3way_handshake_scan_address_generate(void)
27 {
28 static nrf_ecb_hal_data_t block_config;
29
30 m_revcpy( &block_config.key[0], &irk_in_scanner[0], SOC_ECB_KEY_LENGTH);
31 m_revcpy( &block_config.cleartext[0], challeng_from_advertiser,
32 LL_CHALLENGE_FROM_ADV_LENGTH);
33 soc_ecb_block_encrypt(&block_config);
34
35 memcpy(response_address_in_3way_handshake, challeng_from_advertiser,
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36 LL_CHALLENGE_FROM_ADV_LENGTH );
37 memcpy(response_address_in_3way_handshake+LL_CHALLENGE_FROM_ADV_LENGTH,
38 &block_config.ciphertext[0], LL_SCAN_PRA_CIPHER_LENGTH_ENHANCE);
39 return true;
40 }
41
42 bool scanner_3way_handshake_Rs_deploy_cipher_generate(void)
43 {
44 static nrf_ecb_hal_data_t block_config;
45 uint8_t concatenation_Ra1_RS_scanner[LL_SCAN_RA1_RS_LENGTH];
46 memset(&concatenation_Ra1_RS_scanner[0], 0x00, LL_SCAN_RA1_RS_LENGTH);
47
48 (void)soc_rand_lowerstack_vector_get(&deployed_counter_from_scanner[0],
49 LL_SCAN_DEPLOY_RS_LENGTH);
50
51 memcpy( concatenation_Ra1_RS_scanner, challeng_from_advertiser,
52 LL_CHALLENGE_FROM_ADV_LENGTH );
53 memcpy( concatenation_Ra1_RS_scanner + LL_CHALLENGE_FROM_ADV_LENGTH,
54 deployed_counter_from_scanner, LL_SCAN_DEPLOY_RS_LENGTH );
55
56 m_revcpy( &block_config.key[0], &irk_in_scanner[0], SOC_ECB_KEY_LENGTH);
57 m_revcpy( &block_config.cleartext[0], challeng_from_advertiser,
58 LL_CHALLENGE_FROM_ADV_LENGTH);
59 soc_ecb_block_encrypt(&block_config);
60
61
62 ll_xor_encrypt_fast(&concatenation_Ra1_RS_scanner[0],
63 SOC_ECB_CIPHERTEXT_LENGTH,
64 (void*)&block_config.ciphertext[0] );
65 memcpy( &deployed_counter_from_scanner_cipher[0],
66 &concatenation_Ra1_RS_scanner[0],
67 LL_SCAN_DEPLOY_COUNTER_CIPHER_LENGTH);
68 return true;
69
70 }
71
72 void scanner_pdu_build_address_and_deployed_counter(ul_pdu_dd_pdu_t * to_pdu)
73 {
74 if(scanner_3way_handshake_scan_address_generate() == true)
75 {
76 memcpy(&(to_pdu->content)[UL_PDU_DD_SENDER_ADDRESS_OFFSET],
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77 response_address_in_3way_handshake, LL_SCAN_RPA_LENGTH);
78 }
79 if( scanner_3way_handshake_Rs_deploy_cipher_generate() == true )
80 {
81 memcpy(&(to_pdu->content)[UL_PDU_DD_PAYLOAD_OFFSET],
82 deployed_counter_from_scanner_cipher,
83 LL_SCAN_DEPLOY_COUNTER_CIPHER_LENGTH);
84 }
85
86 }
87
88 static void scanner_rcv_challenge_and_send_response()
89 {
90 ...............
91 if ( scanner_3way_handshake_flag == true ) &&
92 ( scanner_3way_handshake_scan_address_generate() == true )
93 && (scanner_3way_handshake_Rs_deploy_cipher_generate() == true ))
94 {
95 scanner_pdu_build_address_and_deployed_counter(&m_tx_pdu);
96 }
97
98 ...............
99 }
100
101 static void m_build_response_packet(ul_pdu_dd_pdu_t *p_pdu,
102 ul_pdu_dd_packet_type_t reply_packet)
103 {
104 ...............
105 if(UL_PDU_DD_3WAY_RESPONSE == reply_packet)
106 {
107 ul_pdu_dd_pdu_reset(p_pdu);
108 ul_pdu_dd_set_packet_type(p_pdu,
109 UL_PDU_DD_3WAY_RESPONSE);
110
111 }
112 ...............
113 }
114
115 btle_status_codes_t scanner_prepare(uint32_t pkt_timeout_us)
116 {
117 ...............
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118 else if(m_scanner.params.scan_type == LL_SCAN_ACTIVE)
119 {
120
121 m_build_response_packet(&m_tx_pdu, UL_PDU_DD_3WAY_RESPONSE );
122
123 }
124 ...............
125 }
126
127 void hal_message_receiving_callback(bool crc_ok)
128 {
129 ...............
130 case UL_PDU_DD_3WAY_CHALLENGE:
131 ...............
132 if( m_received_packet_type == UL_PDU_DD_3WAY_CHALLENGE)
133 {
134 scanner_3way_handshake_flag = true;
135 memcpy(&adv_RPA_in_3way_handshake[0],
136 (uint8_t *)&(m_rx_pdu.content)[UL_PDU_DD_SENDER_ADDRESS_OFFSET],
137 UL_PDU_DD_DEV_ADDR_SIZE);
138 memcpy(&challeng_from_advertiser[0],
139 (void*)&adv_RPA_in_3way_handshake[0],
140 LL_CHALLENGE_FROM_ADV_LENGTH);
141 address_accepted = true ;
142 }
143 ...............
144
145 ...............
146 case M_STATE_RECEIVE_SCAN_RSP:
147 if( 0 == memcmp(adv_RPA_in_3way_handshake,
148 (uint8_t *)&(m_rx_pdu.content)[UL_PDU_DD_SENDER_ADDRESS_OFFSET],
149 LL_ADV_RPA_LENGTH) )
150 {
151 address_accepted_in_3way_handshake = true;
152 if( le_initilize_keystream_to_decrypt_advertiser() == true )
153 {
154 m_revcpy(&confirm_from_advertiser[0],
155 (uint8_t *)&(m_rx_pdu.content)[UL_PDU_DD_PAYLOAD_OFFSET],
156 LL_NONCE_CONFIRM);
157 le_xor_encrypt_fast(&Rs_confirm_from_advertiser[0],
158 LL_ADVERTISER_KEYSTREAM_LENGTH,
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159 (void*)&key_stream_for_advertiser_decryption[0]);
160
161
162 }
163 }
164 ...............
165 }
A.2.2 Advertiser
1 bool le_initilize_keystream_to_decrypt_scanner()
2 {
3 static nrf_ecb_hal_data_t block_config;
4 m_revcpy( &block_config.key[0], &irk_peer_scanner[0],
5 SOC_ECB_KEY_LENGTH);
6 m_revcpy( &block_config.cleartext[0], challeng_in_3way_handshake,
7 LL_CHALLENGE_FROM_ADV_LENGTH);
8 soc_ecb_block_encrypt(&block_config);
9 memcpy(&key_stream_for_scanner_decryption[0],
10 (void*)&block_config.ciphertext[0],
11 LL_SCANNER_KEYSTREAM_LENGTH);
12 return true;
13 }
14
15 bool le_initialize_key_stream_to_encrypt_advertiser()
16 {
17 static nrf_ecb_hal_data_t block_config;
18 m_revcpy( &block_config.key[0], &irk_in_advertiser[0],
19 SOC_ECB_KEY_LENGTH);
20 m_revcpy( &block_config.cleartext[0], challeng_in_3way_handshake,
21 LL_CHALLENGE_FROM_ADV_LENGTH);
22 soc_ecb_block_encrypt(&block_config);
23 memcpy(&key_stream_for_advertiser_encryption[0],
24 (void*)&block_config.ciphertext[0],
25 LL_ADVERTISER_KEYSTREAM_LENGTH);
26 return true;
27 }
28
29 bool advertiser_3way_handshake_challenge_generate()
30 {
31
32 static nrf_ecb_hal_data_t block_config;
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33
34 (void)soc_rand_lowerstack_vector_get(&random_number_PRA[0],
35 LL_ADV_RANDOM_LENGTH_PRA_ENHANCE);
36
37 m_revcpy( &block_config.key[0], &irk_in_advertiser[0],
38 SOC_ECB_KEY_LENGTH);
39 m_revcpy( &block_config.cleartext[0], random_number_PRA,
40 SOC_ECB_CLEARTEXT_LENGTH);
41 soc_ecb_block_encrypt(&block_config);
42
43 memcpy(challeng_in_3way_handshake, random_number_PRA,
44 LL_ADV_RANDOM_LENGTH_PRA_ENHANCE );
45 memcpy(challeng_in_3way_handshake+LL_ADV_CIPHER_LENGTH_PRA_ENHANCE,
46 &block_config.ciphertext[0],
47 LL_ADV_CIPHER_LENGTH_PRA_ENHANCE);
48
49 return true;
50 }
51
52 void le_cmd_set_advertising_parameters()
53 {
54 ...............
55 if( parameters->own_address_type == BTLE_ADDR_TYPE_RANDOM )
56 {
57
58 if( parameters->own_address_type == BTLE_ADDR_TYPE_RANDOM &&
59 parameters->type == BTLE_ADV_TYPE_3WAY_HANDSHAKE )
60 {
61 memcpy( &m_ll_ctrl.dev_cfg.random_bd_addr.value[0],
62 &challeng_in_3way_handshake[0], LL_ADV_RPA_LENGTH );
63 le_initilize_keystream_to_decrypt_scanner();
64 le_initialize_key_stream_to_encrypt_advertiser();
65 m_ll_ctrl.dev_cfg.random_bd_addr.is_set = true;
66 }
67 ...............
68 }
69
70 void le_message_receiving_callback( bool crc_ok )
71 {
72 ...............
73 if(crc_ok && UL_PDU_DD_3WAY_RESPONSE == received_packet_type)
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74 {
75
76 received_packet_type = ul_pdu_dd_get_packet_type(&m_received_pdu);
77 memcpy(&deployment_from_scanner[0], &m_received_pdu.content[15],
78 LL_DEPLOYMENT_FROM_SCANNER_LENGTH);
79 le_xor_encrypt_fast(&deployment_from_scanner[0] ,
80 LL_SCANNER_KEYSTREAM_LENGTH,
81 &key_stream_for_scanner_decryption[0]);
82 if(memcmp(&deployment_from_scanner[0], &challeng_in_3way_handshake[0],
83 LL_CHALLENGE_FROM_ADV_LENGTH)==0)
84 {
85
86 memcpy(&confirm_Rs_in_advertiser[0], &deployment_from_scanner[3],
87 LL_SCANNER_DEPLOYED_Rs_LENGTH);
88 le_xor_encrypt_fast(&confirm_Rs_in_advertiser[0] ,
89 LL_SCANNER_KEYSTREAM_LENGTH,
90 &key_stream_for_advertiser_encryption[0]);
91
92 }
93 memcpy(&m_scan_resp_pdu.content[UL_PDU_DD_PAYLOAD_OFFSET],
94 &confirm_Rs_in_advertiser[0], LL_RS_LENGTH);
95 memcpy(&m_scan_resp_pdu.content[UL_PDU_DD_PAYLOAD_OFFSET],
96 &m_scan_resp_pdu[0], m_advertiser.shadow_srsp_data_length);
97 le_xor_encrypt_fast(&m_scan_resp_pdu.content[UL_PDU_DD_PAYLOAD_OFFSET],
98 LL_ADVERTISER_KEYSTREAM_LENGTH,
99 &key_stream_for_advertiser_encryption[0]);
100
101 ...............
102 }
